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Abstract 
What explains young people’s low level of trust in democratic institutions? Seeking to answer this 
question, the paper at hand examines the root causes of a steady erosion of institutional trust found 
among young people in the age of 15 to 24 in Honduras.  
 
The methodological framework applied in the paper is constructed around a causal research design in 
which two theoretical frames are distinguished; one emphasizing democratic performance and the 
other civic culture. After translating these two frames into two separate hypotheses, both are tested 
against an empirical foundation consisting of a combination of quantitative and qualitative data. For 
the quantitative part, data from public opinion surveys carried out between 2004 and 2015 are 
compiled and systematically aggregated around four sets of indicators. For the qualitative part existing 
empirical literature on the recent developments in Honduras is then employed to strengthen the 
internal validity of the findings from the quantitative analysis. 
 
The paper concludes that Honduran youths’ low trust in democratic institutions is caused by a lack of 
political performance. Declining levels of citizen security, increasing levels of corruption and the 
perception that there is an inherent incapability in the political system to deal with these issues 
constitute the main determinants in explaining why young people distrust democratic institutions. The 
paper furthermore finds that economic performance perception when it comes to the democratic 
system’s ability to provide quality service delivery, job opportunities and sound personal economic 
situations have no correlation to the level of trust youth have in democratic institutions. Similarly, no 
evidence is found of a relation between civic culture and institutional trust among youth, as measures 
of civic engagement and social capital demonstrate no empirical association to the phenomenon of 
democratic trust. 
 
By dealing with institutional trust in an unconsolidated developing democracy in Latin America, the 
paper contributes to a recent trend, in which increasing academic attention is directed to problems of 
low democratic trust in Latin America. Treating youth as the object of study, the paper furthermore 
suggests that much analytical insight can be gained from examining trends among specific sections of 
a population. As such, it is argued that the paper serves as an example that 1) studies of democratic 
trust in developing contexts is not only possible but highly necessary, and 2) that studies of democratic 
trust have much to gain from looking at specific sub-groups within the general population. 
___________________ 
Key words: trust, democratic institutions, youth, performance perception, civic culture 
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Making democracy perform 




“No one is born a good citizen; no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are processes 
that continue to evolve over a lifetime. Young people must be included from birth. A 
society that cuts itself off from its youth severs its lifeline; it is condemned to bleed to 
death.” 
- Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations 
(World Youth Report 2003: 271) 
 
In recent years, concerns have risen regarding young people’s trust and lack of participation in formal 
channels of democracy. Fewer and fewer young people join political parties, voting turn-outs are low 
compared to older segments of the population and trust in democracy is decreasing among youth in 
many countries.  
 
Latin America is no exception. According to a 2008 report from the Economic Commission on Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), almost 42 percent of Latin American youth state that they are 
indifferent to the kind of government regime, they have, and that under certain circumstances, they 
would accept an authoritarian regime. At the same time, 13 percent less young people in the region 
vote compared to their older counterparts (www.cepal.org, 11/03/2016).  
 
The small Central American state, Honduras, constitutes a particularly worrying example of this 
development. According to Marta Lagos, Honduras is the only country in Latin America where less 
people support democracy as a system of government than are satisfied with its performance (Lagos 
2003: 167). John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson furthermore point out that Honduras has an 
unusually high number of people who are so-called “triply dissatisfied”, meaning that they score low 
on support for democracy, support for national institutions and evaluation of the government’s 
performance (Seligson and Booth 2009: 2). The problem is especially relevant among the young 
population of Honduras. While decreasing trust in the democratic system, as we have seen, can be 
measured in the population in general, it is however most evident when it comes to people in the ages 
of 15 to 24. Looking at statistics from the independent Chilean public opinion survey, Latinobarómetro, 
this is the case both when it comes to support for democracy as a system of government and when 
looking at trust in specific democratic institutions. Regarding the general support for democracy, the 
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portion of Honduran youth who see democracy as “preferable to any other form of government” has 
dropped almost 17 percentage points during the last 10 years, going from 52.5 percent in 2006 to 35.9 
percent in 2015. The equivalent numbers for the general population are 51 and 40 
(www.latinobarometro.org, 23/03/2016). Regarding trust in three of the most central democratic 
institutions, the picture is the same. In the last five years alone, the number of youth who have either 
“a lot” or “some” trust in Government has dropped 18.1 percent, from 43.1 to 25.0 percent, trust in 
the Judiciary has dropped 11.8 percent from 35.2 to 23.4 percent, and trust in Congress has dropped 
13.7 percent, from 34.8 to 21.1 percent (Ibid., 23/03/2016). In all three cases, a quarter or less of the 
total youth population express trust towards the system, demonstrating a serious lack of legitimacy of 
the democratic institutions.  
 
In recognition of the importance of including youth in formal processes of democratic participation, the 
international community has focused increasing attention on the subject. In 2012, United Nation’s 
Secretary General, Ban-Ki Moon, presented his latest five-year action plan, which included as one of 
five imperatives, “the engagement of youth in social, economic and political development” (UNDP 
2013: 11). Similarly, the issue of youth participation has recently received renewed academic attention, 
with a range of studies seeking to explain how young people understand and participate in democracy. 
As argued by Sherrod et. al. even though this renewed interest has meant that “the field of youth civic 
engagement has come of age”, it is still young and there is “a need for more academic attention in the 
area of political engagement and views of youth” (Sherrod et. al. 2010: 158-59). 
 
This paper places itself within this field, seeking to understand the particular tendencies of young 
people’s perception of democracy in Honduras. Examining the reasons for the distrust of young 
Hondurans in democracy and democratic institutions, the question it poses and seeks to answer is the 
following:  
 
Why do Honduran youth have low trust in democratic institutions? 
 
In the following, the contextual, methodological and theoretical framework of the study at hand will be 
outlined. Chapter one places Honduras in a comparative perspective and examines the current 
democratic situation in the country. Chapter two introduces the methodological approach which will 
be applied to answer to the problem formulation. Chapter three outlines two main theoretical strands 
on democratic trust, one focusing on the economic and political performance and people’s perception 
of such performance, and the other focusing on the role of civil society and active civic engagement. 
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Chapter four presents the empirical analysis, applying each of these theories to the Honduran context, 
in order to test which of the two best explains why Honduran youth have low trust in democratic 
institutions. Finally, chapter 5 discusses the implications of the paper’s findings for democratic theory 
and for democracy in developing countries such as Honduras. 
 
 
Honduras in a comparative perspective 
 
Applying democratic theory to the Latin American context 
Most studies of democratic trust have focused on the evident decline in popular confidence in 
advanced, industrialized democracies, while few have explored the causes of low confidence in 
democratic government institutions in developing countries. Lately, however, a range of studies 
focusing on developing countries have seen the light of day. Mark J. Payne and Marta Lagos’ studies of 
the Latin American region as a whole (Payne 2002 and Lagos 2001, 2003) and Espinal, Hartlyn and 
Kelly’s study of the Dominican Republic (Espinal et. al. 2006) represent three main examples of studies 
of trust in democratic institutions in a Latin American context.  
 
Applying theory which is mainly developed through studies of democratically consolidated and, for the 
most part Western, countries, to a development context entails a certain risk of ethnocentric bias. 
Therefore, in studies such as the one at hand, normative and epistemological reflections concerning 
the applicability of theories and their conceptualization are much-needed. While the abovementioned 
studies provide us with a platform from which analysis of the Latin American context is 
methodologically and normatively viable, it is necessary to remember that much variation exists within 
the Latin American context as well. Honduras is a country with massive democratic deficits and scholars 
and professionals continuously debate whether or not the country should actually be labelled a 
democracy (Boussard 2003: 154-155). The following section will briefly introduce the recent political 
history of Honduras, in order to place the country in a comparative perspective and lay out the 
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Democracy in Honduras – troubled, yet resilient 
Robert Dahl has, in his 1989-book “Democracy and its critics” provided us with a conception of 
democracy, which makes it possible to determine whether or not a country can be characterized as 
democratic. First of all, in order to talk about democracy, or what Dahl refers to as polyarchy, two 
general characteristics must exist: “Citizenship must be extended to a relatively high proportion of 
adults, and the rights of citizenship must include the opportunity to oppose and vote out the highest 
officials in the government” (Dahl 1989: 220). Elaborating his theory, Dahl explicates that seven 
institutions must be present in order for a state to be considered a polyarchy; the seven institutions 
are: 
1) elected officials 
2) free and fair elections 
3) inclusive suffrage 
4) the right to run for office 
5) freedom of expression 
6) alternative information 
7) associational autonomy 
(Source: Dahl 1989: 221)    
 
On paper, these seven institutions are in place in Honduras and have been since the constitution, 
declaring the country a democratic presidential republic, entered into force in 1982 (www.cia.gov, 
25/06/2016). In terms of citizenship, articles 36 and 37 of the Honduran constitution establish that, “all 
Hondurans above the age of 18 are citizens” and that “it is the right of the citizen to elect and be 
elected” (www.oas.org, 25/06/2016, author’s translation). Furthermore, articles 196 and 237, state 
that the president and members of parliament are elected for a period of 4 years after which general 
elections are to be held (Ibid., 25/06/2016). Finally, articles 61 and 78 speak of the liberties concerning 
freedom of association, access to alternative information and associational autonomy (Ibid., 
25/06/2016). When looking at the constitutional guarantees alone, Honduras qualifies as a 
consolidated democracy. In practice, however, the picture is somewhat more blurred. 
 
In order to understand the concrete nature of Honduran democracy, an expansion of Dahl’s criteria for 
what qualifies as a democracy can be useful. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan have presented the idea of 
democratic consolidation referring to the situation where “none of the major political actors, parties, 
or organized interests, forces, or institutions considers that there is any alternative to democratic 
processes to gain power … and democracy is considered the “only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 
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1996: 15). According to Linz and Stepan, consolidation takes place at three levels; constitutionally, 
attitudinally and behaviourally. Constitutionally, all major organs act according to the democratic 
institutions. Attitudinally, most people accept that democracy is the best form of government. And 
behaviourally, no group is seriously engaged in secession or regime change (Ibid.,: 15). Similarly, 
Guillermo O’Donnell has added two reservations, which are relevant when it comes to the Honduran 
case. The first states that “elected officials should not be arbitrarily terminated before the end of their 
constitutionally mandated terms” and the second, that “elected authorities should not be subject to 
severe constraints, vetoes, or exclusion from certain policy domains by other, nonelected actors, 
especially the armed forces” (O’Donnell 1996a: 35). 
 
Including these perspectives and taking a closer look at the Honduran system, we see a different 
picture. Starting with O’Donnell’s reservations, it can first be observed that the military has always 
played a prominent role in Honduran politics. The change from military to democratic regime in the 
early 1980’s was initiated by the military government itself as a result of internal controversies and after 
pressure from the United States which wanted a more reliable partner in their fight against the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua (Boussard 2003: 157). In the years after the regime change, the military 
maintained close ties to the National Party (PN) and remained in control of foreign relations, defense, 
public works and finance (Ibid.,: 156). Initially, it was also agreed, that there would be no investigation 
of military corruption, that the military would have a veto over cabinet appointments and that there 
would be no interference of civilians in military affairs (Lapper 1985: 81; Acker 1988: 115). Several 
constitutional amendments over the last three decades have slowly moved Honduras in a more 
democratic direction and reduced the influence of the armed forces. Most notable is the 1998 
amendment which placed the armed forces under civilian control for the first time since 1957 (Boussard 
2003: 171). In practice, however, this and other amendments have not stopped the military from 
intervening. The most recent example of military interference took place as late as in 2009, when then 
president Manuel Zelaya from the Liberal Party (PL) was forcefully removed from power by the military, 
in what most observers characterize as a coup d’état. Zelaya was deposed after he had attempted to 
change the constitution and remove the presidential one-term limit (Harding 2015: 1). 
 
The ousting of Zelaya shows that the military remains an important player in Honduran politics, and in 
O’Donnell’s terms it is a clear example of a breach of the first principle that “elected officials should not 
be arbitrarily terminated before the end of their constitutionally mandated terms”. Then, does that 
mean that democracy is not “the only game in town”? Although it certainly represents a democratic 
setback and contributes to the picture of an unstable democracy, it is interesting to note that 
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proponents of the military intervention against Zelaya argue that it was constitutionally founded and 
came about as a direct response to Zelaya’s attempt to obstruct democratic institutions (Shifter 2009d). 
In support of this argument, it can be noted that the military, in the aftermath of the coup did not form 
a government itself, but in accordance with the constitution installed vice-president Roberto Micheletti 
(PL) as interim president until a new round of presidential elections could be organized and executed. 
From this perspective, it is possible to interpret the military interference as a defense for democracy, 
rather than an attack on it. In the terms of Linz and Stepan, while the military’s continued meddling in 
the political sphere certainly represents a problem at the constitutional level, it is thus not the case at 
the behavioral level, as the goal was never to return to military rule, replacing democracy with an 
authoritarian government. 
 
At the behavioral level, however, other issues challenge democratic consolidation. Some authors have 
argued that the presence of organized criminal syndicates and the power they hold vis-à-vis the state, 
constitutes an example of a major actor which considers that a viable “alternative to democratic 
processes to gain power” does exist (see for example Bosworth 2010, and Carment & Samy 2011). 
Indeed, several reports of the limited resources of the state to fight organized crime as well as 
demonstrations of links between cartel leaders and public officials have seen the light of day over the 
years. Others argue, that the extremely high levels of corruption and human rights violations which 
have plagued the country during the entire period constitute another example of the lack of 
consolidation at the behavioural level. Looking at numbers from the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
operated by the German-based international anti-corruption organization, Transparency International 
(TI), we get an idea of the problem with corruption in the country. Since 2001, Honduras has scored 
less than 30 points on a scale from 0-100, where 0 represents a “highly corrupt” and 100 a “very clean” 
public sector, placing Honduras well below its Central American neighbours Guatemala, Nicaragua and 
El Salvador (www.transparency.org, 29/06/2016). The picture is no better when it comes to respect for 
human rights. While the recent killing of leader of the indigenous rights group Copinh, Berta Cáceres, 
has drawn international attention to Honduras, the problematic is by no means new in the country, 
which has a historic track record of human rights violations. According to the UK-based human rights 
organization, Global Witness, Honduras is the country with highest number of killings of environmental 
and land defenders per capita, with 111 of these activists having been killed between 2002 and 2014 
(Global Witness 2015: 4). 
 
Considering the above, it is safe to conclude that major obstacles exist before we can meaningfully call 
Honduras democratically consolidated. In spite of political instability and rampant corruption, it is 
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however worth remembering that the country, except for the 2009 incidence, has enjoyed more than 
30 years of uninterrupted democratic elections, which have for the most part been characterized as 
free and fair and where power has shifted peacefully between different political parties. Likewise, 
regarding attitudinal consolidation, the support for democracy among the general population has been 
stable at a high level during the entire period. Looking at figures from Latinobarómetro, the number of 
people in the general population who either “agree” or “agree a lot” that democracy is the best form 
of government has remained around 65 percent during the last fifteen years, with a small but 
interesting peak in the years after the coup (www.latinobarometro.org, 25/06/2016, 2008: 66 percent, 
2009: 71 percent, 2010: 74 percent). 
 
A peculiar stability thus seems to characterize Honduran democracy. While corruption levels have 
remained high and grave human rights issues remain, the democratic institutions continue to exist and 
the popular backing has until recently remained at a high level. As such it is possible to say that, political 
instability has become institutionalized and that Honduran democracy, with all its defects, has 
demonstrated a certain level of resilience, which should not necessarily lead us to conclude that a 
return to an authoritarian regime is close. It does, however, highlight the importance of following 
developments closely, especially when it comes to people’s support for democracy as a system of 
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Methodology 
This chapter introduces the overall methodological approach of the paper. The first section introduces 
the object of study; Honduran youth. The second section presents the research design, which will be 
applied in order to answer the problem formulation and the empirical foundation on which it builds. 
 
Object of study: Honduran youth 
As mentioned, this study focuses on the democratic attitudes of youth. In this section, we will clarify 
what this means and have a closer look at the specific context in which Honduran youth find 
themselves. 
 
Defining “youth”  
Describing what characterizes a certain age group at a certain point in time involves a somewhat 
arbitrary delimitation. This is especially the case when dealing with youth, as such delimitation 
transcends the traditional minor-major boundary, where a person is considered a minor, until a certain 
age, when he or she enters into adulthood and receives the full legal status of a citizen. In line with this, 
UNESCO states that youth is best understood as a period of transition and should therefore be regarded 
a fluid category rather than a fixed age-group (www.unesco.org, 21/04/2016). 
 
In recent years, however, there has been a growing recognition in academic as well as professional 
circles of the need to treat the transitionary phase from childhood to adulthood as an independent 
analytical category (Cano and Pastor Seller 2016: 119). International organizations such as the World 
Bank and the International Labour Organizations (ILO) provide statistics on everything from youth 
unemployment to youth literacy rates and a wide range of official UN documents concerning the role 
of youth in society have seen the light of day. Although, there is a certain definitional span across the 
various international organs1, the most commonly used definition, is the straight-forward one proposed 
by the UN, referring to youth as “persons between the ages of 15 to 24 years” (www.un.org, 
22/04/2016). This definition is also widely applied in the Latin American context, one of the latest 
examples being the 2005 Ibero-American Convention on Rights of Youth, the first international treaty 
recognizing young people as specific subjects of rights with legal status and as strategic and capable 
actors in development (CIDJ 2008: 26). In line with the UN definition, the convention, in article 1, defines 
                                                          
1 UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO and ILO all regard youth as people in the ages of 15-24 years old. The African Youth 
Charter (AYC) refers to youth as people in the ages of 15-35 years old, whereas the UN Habitat (Youth Fund) refers 
to youth as people in the ages of 15-32. 
Development and International Relations  29 July 2016 




Student number: 20141885  Page 13 of 61 
youth as “all persons, nationals or residents of any country, between 15 and 24 years old” (Ibid.,: 11). 
The paper at hand, will apply the definition presented by the CIDJ. 
 
Besides from definitional delimitation, understanding a specific youth population requires an 
understanding of the context in which they find themselves. Social, cultural and political factors shape 
the way  youth can act and affect the choices they make and the way they perceive of the world. While 
the previous chapter introduced the democratic situation of the country, in the following, we will have 
a closer look at the specific characteristics of youth in Honduras and some of the social and cultural 
factors with especial relevance to them. 
 
Being young in Honduras 
According to the most recent census by the Honduran National Statistics Institute (INE), conducted in 
2013, Honduran youth make up 23.77 percent, or almost one quarter, of the country’s total population 
(www.ine.gob.hn, 15/03/2016). In absolute numbers, this amounts to 1.974.263 million people 
between the ages of 15-24 years. A slight majority of these, 55.1 percent, are urban dwellers, compared 
to 44.9 percent who are living in rural areas. 
 
Socio-economic status 
Besides from political instability, Honduran youth find themselves in a society characterized by a very 
high degree of social grievance. As we see in figure 1 on the next page, Honduras is the Latin American 
country with the highest relative number of both poor and extremely poor young people – when looking 
at the population between 15 and 29 years old (ECLAC 2008: 35). As much as 66.3 percent grow up in 
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Figure 1. “Incidence of poverty and extreme poverty among youth in Ibero-America, 
around 2006” (percentages) 
 
Source: ECLAC 2008: 35 
Looking at the statistics on occupation and education we see some interesting trends. Regarding 
education, youth literacy has increased significantly during recent years and is currently at 95.7 percent 
(www.data.worldbank.org, 15/03/2016). Educational levels in general, however, remain low and the 
number of enrolled students decreases drastically from primary to secondary and tertiary education. 
Looking at the most updated net enrolment rates from 2013, we see that 89.3 percent of youth 
belonging to the official primary education age-group are enrolled. When it comes to secondary 
enrolment, numbers decline to 48.6 percent. Net enrolment rates for tertiary education do not exist, 
but gross enrolment rates are at 21.1 percent (www.data.worldbank.org, 15/03/2016). Furthermore, 
Honduras ranks third among Latin American countries in terms of educational inequality, with a 6.2-
year gap between the average years of schooling of respectively the lowest and highest income quintile 
(Cruces et. al. 2011: 4). Regarding employment, data from the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
underlines the lack of opportunities for youth in Honduras. Recent figures, show that as much as 41.4 
percent of Honduran youth are so-called “NEETs”, referring to youth who are “neither in education, 
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A culture of violence 
One of the most evident societal problems facing youth in Honduras is the so-called “culture of 
violence” which plagues the country (Reyes and Cardenas 2014: 1). Fragile state structures and an 
unfortunate geographic position between South American cocaine producing states of Colombia, Peru 
and Bolivia, and the number one consumer nation, USA, has made Honduras an ideal transit route for 
illicit drugs, and a place from which drug cartels can easily and effectively manage their trans-national 
business. Combined with the emergence of youth gangs, the existence of organized criminal networks 
has resulted in increasing unrest, as violence and extortion have become common in many 
neighbourhoods across the country (Fong 2016: 1). 
 
In an attempt to deal with street gangs and organized crime syndicates, Honduras has, since 2003, along 
with Mexico and the rest of the Central American states (with the notable exception of Nicaragua) been 
implementing the so-called Mano Dura policy (“Hard Hand”), promoted and partly financed by 
consecutive US administrations. Mano Dura policies include “deploying the military for internal policing, 
in addition to lengthening prison sentences, suspending due process guarantees and other protections 
for alleged criminals, and aggressively arresting youths suspected of gang membership” (Seligson et. al. 
2010: 68). While proponents argue for the need to strike hard and persistently on violent criminal 
activity, this hard-line policy has also resulted in a surge in death rates and a militarization of the general 
public space, as clashes between police and gang members have become an everyday occurrence. 
 
The violence is directly reflected in the criminal statistics. According to recent data from the UN Office 
on Crime and Drugs (UNODC), in 2012, 91 intentional homicides were registered per 100.000 people in 
Honduras. This is almost twice the number of homicides recorded in the second-placed country, 
Venezuela, with a record of 54 homicides per 100.000 people, and it represents an increase of more 
than 62 percent over a 10-year period (www.data.worldbank.org, 06/04/2016). As a result of the 
exceedingly high homicide rates, Honduras has several times in recent years won the dubious title as 
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Figure 2. “Intentional homicides in Central America 1999-2013 (per 100.000 people)” 
 
Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime's International Homicide Statistics Database 
 
The National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH) has created a violence observatory which 
gathers data from the different regions in the country, monitoring violence and citizen security.  Figures 
from the observatory show that youth are the age-group most affected by the increasing violence in 
Honduras both on the victim and perpetrator side. In the first quarter of 2012 alone, of the 1.709 people 
killed in Honduras, 920 were young, constituting 54 percent of all violent deaths for that quarter 
(www.laprensa.hn, 24/05/2016). The high levels of violence have in recent years led a considerable 
number of youths to consider a future outside of Honduras. Between 2010 and 2014 alone, a total of 
301.000 Honduran migrants were deported from Mexico and the United States. Of these, 18.000 were 
minors who are sent back to a country, that for many represents a dangerous place marred by violence 
and crime. Processes of migration and deportation deepen the problem as the emergence and 
functioning of street gangs and Maras is closely linked to these migration flows of young Hondurans 
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Political participation 
When it comes to young people’s participation in the political sphere and the spaces of participation 
open to youth in Honduras, it is interesting to see that, compared to other countries in the region, the 
legal framework that surrounds youth is surprisingly strong in Honduras. As one of the first countries, 
Honduras, in 2008, ratified the abovementioned Ibero-American Convention on Rights of Youth (CIDJ). 
The Convention contains 44 articles and addresses the rights of youth, among others in the area of civic 
and political participation. It also determines the obligations of the State to ensure the inclusion of 
youth in society. As stated in Article 21.2, “each State Party undertakes to promote and strengthen 
social processes that generate forms and guarantees to ensure an effective participation of youth from 
all sectors of society, in organizations that encourage inclusion.” (CIDJ 2008: 20). 
 
Recent administrations on both sides of the spectrum have put the subject of youth at the forefront of 
political campaigns and programs. In 2007, a year prior to the ratification of the CIDJ, then president 
Manuel Zelaya from the Liberal Party completed the formulation of a National Youth Policy 2007-2021, 
setting out the main priorities to guarantee the full inclusion and participation of youth in political 
processes. His successor, Porfirio Lobo Sosa, from the National Party continued the articulation of a 
youth-centred approach emphasizing his commitment to “promote a positive attitude towards youth 
and […] open up spaces of participation for youth in decision-making processes” 
(www.observatoriodescentralizacion.org, 24/04/2016). The current administration under the 
leadership of president Juan Orlando Hernandez from the National Party focuses on job creation and 
youth employment through programmes such as “Tu Banca Jóven” (www.latribuna.hn, 25/05/2016). 
As the predecessors, the Hernandez-administration has promoted itself as youth-friendly, stating that 
it sees itself as a “spokesperson for the youth and the vehicle for the transformation of Honduran 
society at the hands of youth” (www.partidonacional.hn, 21/05/2016). 
 
Looking at the participatory patterns of Honduran youth, it is interesting to observe, that while youth, 
as pointed out in the introductory chapters, have very low trust in democracy and democratic 
institutions compared to older segments of the population, their participatory patterns closely 
resemble that of older generations. According to Latinobarómetro, 22.3 percent of youth discuss 
politics with their friends either frequently or very frequently. The equivalent number for the general 
population is only slightly higher, ranging at 24.6 percent. Similarly, 16.5 percent of youth frequently or 
very frequently try to convince someone of their political opinion, whereas the number for the general 
population is 18.7 percent. As much as 13.3 percent of youth frequently or very frequently work for a 
political party or candidate. For the general population, the number is only slightly higher, ranging at 
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17.5 percent. Looking at the disposition to participate in street protests, the tendency is sustained, with 
little or no difference in attitude among youth and older segments of the population. This is the case 
whether the subject of the protest is better salary and working conditions, health and education or 
defence of democratic rights. Later on, we will go more in depth with these numbers and see how they 
relate to the level of trust in democratic institutions. For now, it suffices to consider the simple fact 
alone that, although a quarter this group due to their age is not eligible for voting, their interest and 




In empirical research, the role of theory is determined by the aim of such research, which can be both 
theory-testing or theory-building (Kuada 2012: 21). As a range of theoretical contributions explaining 
variations in democratic trust already exist, this study will apply a deductive theory-testing method in 
which two approaches are distinguished and tested against an empirical case, namely the case of 
Honduran youth and their attitude towards democratic institutions. 
 
The research design applied is a causal design in which it is examined what causes the level of trust 
youth have in democratic institutions to increase or decrease. In order to establish a causal relation 
three conditions must exist; empirical association, appropriate time order, and non-spuriousness 
(Chambliss and Schutt 2013: 105-106). Firstly, concerning empirical association, it needs to be 
substantiated that the independent variable and the dependent variable are linked. Secondly, 
concerning time order, it must be substantiated that the independent variable happened before the 
dependent variable. Thirdly, non-spuriousness relates to the fact that changes in the dependent 
variable are in fact caused by the independent variable and not some third unknown variable (Ibid.,: 
105-106).  
 
While over-time comparison of existing survey data allows us to substantiate empirical association and 
appropriate time order, it is more difficult to address the question of non-spuriousness. Due to the 
possibility that in a social environment an unlimited number of variables might exist, causality can only 
be inferred, never proven. According to Norman Denzin, triangulation can, however, serve to enhance 
the internal validity of a study’s findings. Denzin identifies four basic forms of triangulation; (1) methods 
triangulation, where different data collection methods help the researcher check the consistency of his 
or her findings, (2) triangulation of sources where different data sources are incorporated to give the 
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researcher a broader empirical foundation, (3) analyst triangulation, where multiple analysts review 
the findings, and (4) theoretical triangulation, where more than one theoretical perspective is applied 
to examine and interpret the data (Denzin 2009: 301). In order to heighten the probability of non-
spuriousness, the paper incorporates theoretical triangulation, involving more than one theoretical 
frame in explaining variation in democratic trust as well as methodological triangulation in which 
findings from the quantitative analysis are sought validated through a subsequent qualitative analysis, 




Regarding the empirical foundation, the quantitative analysis draws on data from public opinion surveys 
carried out in Honduras from 2004 to 2015. Data is retrieved from Latinobarómetro, an independent 
private non-profit organization based in Santiago, Chile. In order to ensure representativeness, 
Latinobarómetro use sample sizes of 1000 persons, of which 50 percent are from urban zones and 50 
percent from rural, leaving a margin of error of 3.1 percent. Samples are selected through four stages, 
using systematic random sampling. In the first stage, settlements or neighbourhoods within cities are 
selected through segmentation, ensuring that areas with larger population have a larger probability of 
being selected. In the second stage, sets of houses or blocks within the selected areas are randomly 
selected. Thirdly, all houses within the selected blocks are visited, starting with the first house on the 
right, until the established quotes are reached. Fourthly, household members are interviewed 
according to the actual population distribution in the country (Latinobarómetro 2015: 15). 
 
For the qualitative analysis, empirical data from a range of authors who have dealt with the recent 
political history in Honduras will be drawn in to establish whether or not findings in the quantitative 
analysis can be sustained. These authors comprise: 
 Carvajal, Roger. 2014. “Violence in Honduras: An analysis of the 
failure in public security and the state's response to criminality” 
 Meyer, Peter J. 2014. “Honduras – U.S. Relations” 
 Gutiérrez Rivera. 2013. “Territories of violence” 
 Frank, Dana. 2010. “Repression’s Reward in Honduras?” 
 Bosworth, James. 2010. “Honduras: Organized Crime Gaining 
Amid Political Crisis” 
 Noriega, Roger F. and José J, Lanza. 2013. “Honduras Under Siege” 
 Malkin, Elisabeth. 2013. “Political Doubt Poses Risk to Honduras, 
Battered by Coup and Violence” 
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After introducing the overall methodological approach of the paper, including a presentation of the 
object of study, project design and empirical foundation, the next chapter focuses on the theoretical 
foundation of the paper. Kuada defines theories as “a series of systematic interrelated statements or 
generalizations that explain and anticipate developments in a specific context of phenomenon [...] Thus, 
theory provides the language, the concepts, and assumptions that help researchers make sense of the 
phenomenon that they seek to investigate” (Kuada 2012: 64). In line with this understanding, the 




This paper places itself in the tradition of democratic theory, revolving around concepts of democratic 
institutions, democratic trust and civil society, understood through notions of social capital and civic 
engagement. In this chapter, these and other relevant concepts are defined and contextualized for the 
analysis at hand. Furthermore, the theoretical foundation on which the empirical analysis builds is 
presented and some epistemological issues are addressed and clarified.  
 
Explaining (dis)trust in democratic institutions 
Different levels of democratic trust 
In recent years, as a consequence of the declining support for democracy experienced in many 
countries, increasing academic attention has been directed to the subject. As a result, a large body of 
literature on democratic trust has seen the light of day, contributing to a general theoretical and 
methodological diversification within the field. While this is certainly a positive trait, it also highlights 
the need for delimitation when studying democratic trust. 
 
As various authors have pointed out, first of all it is important to specify what is meant when referring 
to trust in democracy or political systems in general. First, it is important to distinguish normative 
evaluation from performative evaluation. People can be critical of the functioning of democracy while 
maintaining strong support for the principle of democracy itself. Seen from a pro-democratic point of 
view, negative performative evaluation is far less problematic, as it is a surface problem, whereas 
normative evaluation is related to deeper-rooted values which can be harder to change and thus 
require different measures. This study focuses on normative evaluation, seeking to explain the evident 
decline in popular trust in democracy per se, while incorporating performative evaluation as one 
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plausible explanatory factor in generating such (dis)trust. 
 
Secondly, it is important to acknowledge that trust in democracy is a multi-dimensional phenomenon 
(Norris 1999a: 10). Building on David Easton’s analytical framework (Easton 1975), Pippa Norris has 
provided us with a characterization of the different levels of democratic trust, ranging from trust in 
specific political actors, over regime institutions and regime principles to trust in the more general and 
broader political community of the nation-state as a whole (Norris 1999a: 9-11). 
 



















Norris’ model serves as a practical tool, providing the researcher with a continuum on which various 
types of democratic trust can be distinguished and determined. It is very useful because empirical 
evidence strongly suggests that, although popular discussions tend to treat the different levels as 
interchangeable, the public does actually distinguish between them (Dalton and Klingemann, in Norris 
1999a: 13). On the other hand, this paper argues that, while it is important to be clear as to the level 
(Source: Norris 1999a: 11) 
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on which one operates, much analytical insight can be gained by looking at how the different levels 
interact.  
 
Taking a closer look at Norris’ continuum, the first level, the political community, concerns the 
foundation of democracy, looking at people’s sense of belonging and feelings of national identity, often 
measured through the level of interpersonal trust. The second level concerns people’s attitudes 
towards the core regime principals, or basic democratic values. A commonly-used measure for regime 
principal support is people’s agreement to Churchill’s phrase, which states that “democracy might have 
problems, but it is the best form of government”. The third level concerns regime performance, 
referring to people’s satisfaction with the functioning of the democratic or authoritarian system. The 
fourth level deals with support for regime institutions, including attitudes towards governments, 
parliaments, the executive, the legal system and police, the state bureaucracy, political parties, and the 
military. The fifth and most specific level concerns the satisfaction with political actors, such as the 
incumbent president, specific ministers or members of parliament. 
 
This study will focus on the fourth level, support for regime institutions, examining the root causes of 
the rapid decrease in trust among Honduran youth towards three of the country’s main democratic 
institutions; government, parliament and the judiciary. However, in order to explain decreasing trust in 
democratic institutions, two other levels are incorporated, the first level pertaining to the political 
community and the second level, regarding regime performance. Honduras has witnessed a dramatic 
decrease in trust among youth at all these three levels, and understanding how they interact will 
provide us with analytical insights needed to answer the problem formulation.  
 
Theories of democratic trust 
As explained, in the general literature on democratic and institutional trust, a variety of strands exist, 
providing us with a range of factors which can explain the emergence of trust or distrust in the political 
system. In spite of this analytical diversity, it is, however, possible to extract or distinguish two major 
strands of theories or “schools” – one focusing mainly on economic and political factors and the other 
on cultural factors. These two schools provide us with two distinct theoretical frames for understanding 
why young Hondurans lose faith in democratic institutions. By applying and comparing the theoretical 
frames proposed by each of these schools to the Honduran context, this paper seeks to test the 
explanatory power of each of these theories. In the following chapter, the two theoretical frames will 
be presented and the concepts and normative assumptions on which they build outlined. They will then 
be translated into two separate hypotheses, which will be tested in the analytical chapter. 
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Performance perception: economic and political performance 
The first theoretical frame revolves around people’s perception of the polity’s ability to deliver tangible 
results as the main factor in determining the level of trust they designate to their polity. Understood 
from Norris’ conceptual framework this theoretical frame deals with the link between the third level, 
regarding democratic performance, and the fourth level, pertaining to trust in democratic institutions. 
Democratic performance, in this case, translates into results of both political and economic nature. In 
regards to the economic aspects, people’s perception of their personal economic situation, and the 
system’s ability to provide employment opportunities and to ensure quality service delivery are among 
the main factors determining the level of trust a country’s population designates to its democratic 
institutions. Concerning the political aspects, emphasis is usually placed on subjects such as the degree 
to which democratic institutions are perceived to have integrity, to be responsive as well as their ability 
to provide citizens with a sense of security. 
 
A wide range of studies support this theoretical frame. Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider 
were among the first to promote this line of argumentation. Based on their studies of the development 
in the political climate in the United States from the 1960s to the 1980s, they found that the main cause 
of declining trust in political institutions is to be found in the performance of the polity. Based on 
statistical calculations, Lipset and Schneider demonstrate a causal relation between drops in 
unemployment rates and stabilization in inflation rates on one hand, and increasing levels of confidence 
on the other, leading them to conclude that “confidence levels vary with the state of the economy” 
(Lipset & Schneider 1987: 5). They furthermore argue that The New Deal and World War II served as 
economic and political achievements which led to increased popular confidence in institutions, 
whereas, later on, energy crises, recession, hyperinflation and the Vietnam War affected people’s trust 
negatively (Ibid.,: 20). From this perspective, distrust occurs as a direct response to minor and major 
macro-political events and it is inextricably linked to the democratic performance of any administration. 
 
Other theorists have found somewhat similar results, although several have underlined the importance 
of distinguishing between actual performance and performance perception. Geoffrey Evans and 
Stephen Whitefield’s study of trust in democratic transition states constitutes an example of such 
distinction. In their study of 8 Eastern European states, Evans and Whitefield cross-examine the relation 
between respondents’ level of trust in democratic institutions with their perception of economic and 
democratic performance. Applying multivariate regression analysis, Evans and Whitefield use two 
indicators for economic and political performance respectively – one which measures the objective 
developments and one which measures people’s perception of those developments. Regarding the 
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economic performance, the two indicators applied are: 1) evaluation of the market’s performance and 
2) evaluation of the respondents’ own and their family’s living standard. In this case, market 
performance is measured by looking at macro-economic data, namely per capita GDP, inflation and 
unemployment rates. Regarding the political performance, the two indicators applied are: 1) evaluation 
of democracy in practice and 2) respondents’ perception of the responsiveness of the political system. 
Here, the objective indicator, democracy in practice, is measured in two ways, namely the degree to 
which constitutional issues are separated from daily politics, and the degree of polarization between 
political institutions, in this case the presidency and parliament. 
 
Evans and Whitefield find that both economic and political performance is relevant, but performance 
perception has more explanatory power than actual performance – especially in the case of political 
performance. They conclude that “both economic and political factors are relevant to predicting 
support for democratic institutions, but that the indicators of political pay-offs have considerably 
stronger effects” (Evans & Whitefield 1995: 503). Furthermore, they underline the fact that no relation 
between actual economic performance, measured on objective macro-indicators and support for 
democracy can be identified, whereas a relation can be identified between people’s perception of their 
own and their family’s economic situation and how much trust they have in democracy. Regarding 
political performance, the tendency is the same. Here, a relation between the actual functioning of 
democracy and support for democracy can be found, but the relation between people’s perception and 
their trust in democracy is much stronger (Ibid.,: 511-512). 
 
Other authors have supported the argument that performance perception is the main factor in 
explaining variation in levels of democratic trust. Herbert Kitschelt, in a similar study of democratic trust 
in transition societies in Eastern Europe, concludes that “people’s perception of their own and their 
country’s economic situation must be seen as key predictors of democratic support” (Kitschelt in Evans 
& Whitefield 1995: 487). Ben Seyd, in his analysis of the role of performance and expectations on 
political trust in the U.K., concludes that “trust is found primarily to reflect performance perceptions 
alone” (Seyd 2015: 73).  
 
As mentioned earlier, although most studies have been conducted in industrialized contexts, the theory 
has also been applied to developing contexts, and with similar results. Espinal et. al.’s study of the 
Dominican Republic is the main example. Measuring people’s satisfaction with three consecutive 
governments’ service delivery, Espinal et. al. find that people’s evaluation of democratic performance 
is a strong predictor of democratic trust, also in a developing country. Pertaining to economic 
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performance, they find a consistent effect on institutional trust. The higher a person scores government 
service delivery, the higher his or her level of trust in the democratic institutions tends to be (Espinal 
et. al. 2006: 14). This is also the case, when it comes to political performance. Measuring developments 
in people’s perception of safety and corruption and comparing it to changes in their attitude towards 
democracy, they demonstrate a clear empirical link between the way people perceive of a system’s 
ability to deliver political results and how well the institutions on which the system builds are evaluated 
(Ibid.,: 15).    
 
Summing op – a theory of performance perception 
It seems logical that a political system which succeeds in bringing its citizens economic and political 
goods are perceived as more trustworthy than a system which fails to do so. As we have seen, a wide 
range of studies provide empirical support for this argument. Although some methodological and 
conceptual variation exists among the different theorists presented above, they all share one main 
characteristic, namely that performance, or for the most part, perception of performance – economic 
as well as political – serves as the main determinant, when it comes to explaining trust in democracy 
and its institutions. As such, it is possible to pool their statements together and claim that they 
represent one singular theoretical framework, which can be applied to explain why trust in democratic 
institutions is low. Applying this theoretical framework to the Honduran case, we should thus expect to 
find a strong relation between young people’s perception of the performance of the system and the 
level of trust they designate to it. As we have seen, different indicators are applied to measure 
economic and political performance. In the following, the way these terms are operationalized for this 




Civic culture: civic engagement and social capital 
The second theoretical frame comprises scholars who emphasize various socio-cultural aspects as 
determining of people’s level of trust in democratic institutions. These scholars share a focus on civil 
society and people’s active engagement with their community as well as the political system. The 
common denominator in their line of argumentation is, that trust in democratic institutions is related 
to, and to some extent determined by, the level of civic engagement and social capital that exists within 
a given population. Understood from Norris’ conceptual framework, this theoretical frame deals with 
the link between the first level, regarding the political community, and the fourth level, trust in 
democratic institutions. 
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Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s 1963 book, “The Civic Culture”, is often mentioned as the first well-
developed empirically grounded theory of political culture, and is considered the backbone of theories 
emphasizing the role of political culture in explaining why people trust their polity (Inglehart 1988: 
1204). Based on a five-nation study of popular attitudes in Mexico, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, Almond and Verba identify three different types of political culture; parochial, 
subject and participant. In parochial cultures “the individual thinks of his family’s advantage as the only 
goal to pursue, or conceives of his role in the political system in familial terms” (Almond and Verba 
1989: 120). This means that citizens in parochial cultures in general have a low degree of orientation 
towards the political system, and considers the idea of citizenship and any individual relation and 
obligation to the state irrelevant. In subject cultures, the individual recognizes the role of citizenship, 
but in a passive, rather than active way. As Almond and Verba write, “the law is something he [the 
citizen] obeys, not something he helps shape” (Ibid.,: 118). In participant cultures people have a high 
level of orientation towards the political system and understands and values the importance of both 
rights and obligations toward the nation-state. Here, the citizen is expected to have “the virtues of the 
subject – to obey the law, to be loyal – but he is also expected to take some part in the formation of 
decisions” (Ibid.,: 118). What is analytically interesting in our case, is that Almond and Verba go on to 
demonstrate that a correlation exists between the type of political culture and the level of democratic 
trust, in which societies dominated by participant cultures display greater degree of trust in democratic 
institutions than cultures dominated by parochial and subject cultures. As they argue, democratic trust 
is “maintained by active citizen participation in civic affairs, by a high level of information about public 
affairs, and by a widespread sense of civic responsibility” (Ibid.,: 9). Through active participation in 
political matters, people become familiar with the political system, while at the same time building the 
social capital required to interact meaningfully with the system. Seemingly, it is possible to explain a 
society’s low trust in democratic institutions by determining the characteristics of civic culture in that 
society, meaning the degree to which people are actively engaged in civil and political matters. Behind 
low levels of trust, we should therefore expect to find a low degree of civic engagement and vice versa. 
Or as stated by Almond and Verba: "If a democratic political system is one in which the ordinary citizen 
participates in political decisions, a democratic political culture should consist of a set of beliefs, 
attitudes, norms, perceptions and the like, that support participation" (Almond and Verba 1989: 178). 
 
Almond and Verba’s theory has laid the foundation for studies of political culture and given direction 
to many other theorists interested in the field of political culture and democratic studies. One of these 
is Robert Putnam who is well-renowned for his studies of civic cultures mainly in Italy and the United 
States. In regards to the former, based on a study of regional governments in 1970s Italy, Putnam 
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develops the theory of social capital and links it to the idea of civic engagement, concluding that the 
level of civic engagement is a determining factor when it comes to the success of democracy (Putnam 
1995: 66). According to Putman, democracy thrives in societies characterized by high degrees of civic 
association and active cultures of civic engagement. In such societies, democratic trust is high because 
political and social networks alike are organized horizontally, and the population’s active engagement 
in civic associations translates into active political participation, which again produces trust in 
democratic institutions. On the other hand, in so-called “uncivic” societies, democratic institutions fail 
to maintain popular support due to their vertical nature of patron-client relations between population 
and polity, rooted in a culture of non-participation, where engagement in civic associations is low. In 
such societies, people lose confidence in democratic institutions, because they experience that “public 
affairs are someone else’s business, not mine” (Putnam 1993).  
 
In his study of civic engagement in the U.S., “Bowling alone”, Putnam demonstrates the dramatic 
decline that has taken place in associational and political activity in the U.S. during the last 30 years. In 
line with his findings in studies of the Italian context, according to Putnam, there is reason to view the 
situation in the US with concern, because civic engagement is closely linked to the destiny of democratic 
institutions. As he says, “institutions (and not only in America) are indeed powerfully influenced by 
norms and networks of civic engagement” (Putnam 1995: 66). Contrary to theorists who underline the 
performance of democracy, Putnam argues that declining trust in the American political system cannot 
be explained by unsuccessful decision-making by politicians alone. Instead, he says that “democracy 
depends on social capital” (Putnam 2000: 505), and he argues that declining trust in the U.S. is to be 
explained by the fact that “American social capital in the form of civic association has significantly 
eroded over the last generation” (Ibid.,: 287). 
 
When it comes to the role of civil society and people’s engagement with the political system, the 
question of Western ethnocentrism again becomes relevant. The concept of civil society and the 
normative implications of applying it is highly debated and by many it is regarded as a purely Western 
concept, which cannot be directly translated to fit a non-western context. Philip Oxhorn, in his 2011 
book “Sustaining Civil Society”, provides us with a sum-up of the different positions; at one end of the 
spectrum, we find scholars such as Chambers and Kymlicka (2002) and Ehrenberg (1999), who argue 
that civil society should be considered present to a greater or lesser degree in almost all social contexts. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Hann (1996), Seligman (1992) and others argue that the concept is 
“so normatively and historically determined by the experience of Western Europe and the United States 
that it is almost impossible to find in other contexts” (Oxhorn 2011: 8). Oxhorn himself presents his 
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understanding of civil society as a collectivist one – focusing on the power structures that exists in the 
interaction between the political system and the people it represents (Ibid.,: 9). This paper applauds 
the usefulness of a context-specific understanding of civil society when it comes to representation of 
people’s interest and the broader role of civil society organizations to the political system. It disagrees, 
however, when it comes to the understanding that there is something inherently problematic in 
applying individualistic understandings of civil society to a non-western context. Individual perceptions 
or attitudes are (for the most part) equally relevant in countries of Western and non-Western descent, 
and stating otherwise is a denial of the fact that modernization, with its set of individual rights and 
obligations has to a high extent taken root in many non-western societies – including Honduras. As 
such, in its focus on civic engagement, this paper centres on the individual, and thus places itself closer 
to the liberal or Lockean perspective than the collectivist understandings of civil society. 
 
Summing op – a theory of civic culture 
Just as it seems logical that democratic institutions gain trust by performing well in economic and 
political terms, it also seems plausible that such trust is related to the civic culture, and the degree to 
which citizens participate in society. As we have seen, several studies provide empirical support for this 
latter argument. These studies share one main characteristic, namely that culture - and not 
performance - serves to explain levels of trust in democracy and its institutions. Robert Inglehart 
brilliantly sums up this position, when he states that “even when democracy has no reply to the 
question, what have you done for me lately? it may be sustained by diffuse feelings that it is an 
inherently good thing” (Inglehart 1988: 1205). Applying this theoretical framework to the Honduran 
case, we should thus expect to find a strong relation between young people’s civic engagement and 
social capital and the level of trust they designate to democratic institutions. 
 
This chapter has presented two distinct theoretical perspectives on what explains people’s trust in 
democratic institutions – one emphasizing performance perception and the other civic culture. In the 
analytical chapter, these two theoretical frames will be treated as independent variables, in order to 
examine and compare their explanatory power when it comes to determining the decreasing trust in 
democratic institutions among youth in Honduras. Before that, an operationalization of the two 
concepts is necessary in order to turn them into measurable entities. 
 
 
Development and International Relations  29 July 2016 




Student number: 20141885  Page 29 of 61 
Operationalization 
The first hypothesis, which will be tested, states that “performance perception determines level of trust 
in democratic institutions”. Performance perception is measured on two arenas; economic and 
political. Regarding economic performance, three indicators will be used to measure Honduran youth’s 
perception of economic performance: (1) satisfaction with service delivery, (2) view of personal 
economic situation, and (3) evaluation of opportunity to find work. Likewise, regarding political 
performance perception, three indicators are applied: (1) evaluation of citizen security, (2) evaluation 
of progress in reducing corruption, and (3) approval of government management. Together, these six 
indicators constitute the first hypothesis, pertaining to democratic performance perception. 
 
The second hypothesis, which will be tested, states that “civic culture determines level of trust in 
democratic institutions”. Civic culture is likewise measured on two arenas; civic engagement and social 
capital. In the first case, three indicators will be used to measure Honduran youth’s civic engagement: 
(1) participation in civic organizations, (2) interest in news, and (3) engagement in talks about politics 
with friends. In a similar fashion, political capital will be measured on three indicators: (1) the degree 
to which politics is considered complicated, (2) interpersonal trust, and (3) level of satisfaction with life. 
Together, these six indicators constitute the second hypothesis, pertaining to civic culture. Figure 4 
provides an overview of the two hypotheses and their corresponding indicators. 
 
Figure 4. “Overview of hypotheses and indicators” 
 
H1 Performance perception determines level of trust in democratic institutions 
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H2I6 Level of satisfaction with life 
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In order to test the two variables, developments on each of the indicators over a 10-year period from 
2005 to 2015 will be compared with developments in democratic trust in the same period. This will 
allow us to determine whether or not a correlation exists between each of the variables and the 
dependent variable. As mentioned earlier, the three institutions which will be included are; 
Government, Congress and Judiciary. An aggregate curve chart is created in which youth’s trust in each 
of these institutions is combined. As we can see in Figure 5, this is possible due to the closely resembling 
developments on each of the curves. 
 
Figure 5. “Aggregate curve chart of Honduran youth’s trust in democratic 
institutions 2004-2015” 
 
Data retrieved from www.latinobarometro.org, 23/06/2016 
 
After this operationalization, where the two theoretical frames have been translated into two distinct 
measurable variables, the methodological framework on which the analysis can build is now 
established. In the following chapter, these two variables will be applied to the selected case in order 
to test the validity of their argumentation and their explanatory power when it comes to answering 
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Analysis: Empirical chapter 
After establishing the methodological and theoretical foundation, the framework needed to conduct 
an analysis is in place. This chapter will test the two delimited variables against the Honduran case in 




Performance perception determines the level of trust in democratic institutions 
 
The first independent variable which will be tested is “performance perception”. In order to examine 
the link between the way Honduran youth perceive of regime performance and the level of trust they 





H1I1 Satisfaction with service delivery 
H1I2 View of personal economic situation 
H1I3 Evaluation of opportunity to find work 
 
In the following, three curve charts will be presented, containing each of the three indicators which 
together constitute economic performance perception; satisfaction with service delivery, view of 
personal economic situation, and evaluation of opportunity to find work. 
 
Figure 6a. “Satisfaction with service delivery” 
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Regarding the first indicator, “satisfaction with service delivery”, no consistent correlation can be 
observed between youth’s satisfaction with service delivery and the level of trust they confer to 
democratic institutions. Looking at the period from 2006 to 2009, changes on the two curves do seem 
to follow a somewhat similar pattern, where higher numbers of youth satisfied with service delivery are 
followed by increased levels of institutional trust, and lower numbers of youth satisfied with service 
delivery are similarly followed by lower levels of trust. In example, the number of youth satisfied with 
service delivery increased from 42.5 percent in 2006 to 50.5 percent in 2007, followed by an increase 
from 30 to 42 percent in the level of institutional trust. From 2010 and onward, however, the picture is 
reversed. Whereas the number of youth who are satisfied with service delivery increases from 2010 to 
2015, going from 38 percent in 2010 to 38.5 in 2011 and 46 percent in 2015, conversely there is a sharp 
decrease in the number of youth who trust in institutions, going from 41 percent in 2010 to 28 percent 
in 2011 and to 23.7 percent in 2015. As such, when looking at service delivery, it appears that no 




Figure 6b. “View of personal economic situation” 
 
Data retrieved from www.latinobarometro.org, 23/06/2016 
 
Looking at the second indicator, “view of personal economic situation”, a closer connection with 
institutional trust can be observed, although it is not entirely constant during the period. From 2005 to 
2008, a decreasing number of youth evaluate their personal economic situation positively. In 2005, 40 
percent viewed their situation as “good” or “very good”, whereas the number in 2006 was 33 percent 
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pattern, going from 32 percent in 2005 to 30 percent in 2006 and 26 percent in 2008. Between 2008 
and 2009 we see an opposing pattern, where trust in institutions increases marginally, although the 
personal economic situation is viewed increasingly negatively. From 2009 to 2011, changes in 
perception of economic situation are followed by comparable changes in institutional trust. Variations 
are however much greater in the latter case, where numbers fluctuate from 27 percent in 2009, over 
41 percent in 2010 to 28 percent in 2011. The corresponding numbers regarding view of personal 
economic situation are 24 percent (2009), 27 percent (2010), and 23 percent (2011). From 2011 and 
onwards, we lack consistent data, and it is difficult to deduct whether or not a meaningful correlation 
exists, although it could seem like an increase in the number of youth who evaluate their economic 
situation positively is followed by an increase in institutional trust. Thus, when it comes to perception 
of personal economic situation, only a weak correlation can be identified between economic 
performance perception and levels of institutional trust. 
 
   
Figure 6c. “Evaluation of opportunity to find work” 
 
Data retrieved from www.latinobarometro.org, 23/06/2016 
 
Concerning the third indicator, “evaluation of opportunity to find work”, no consistent correlation can 
be detected. From 2007 to 2008, a minor decline can be detected in the number of youth who have a 
positive view of their opportunity to find work, going from 32 to 29 percent. Meanwhile, the number 
of youth who trust in democratic institutions was almost halved, going from 42 percent to 25.7 percent 
in 2008. From 2008 to 2009, the two curves show opposite trends, with continued decline in the 
number of youth who positively evaluate their opportunities of finding work, which is reduced to 25 
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curves demonstrate small, insignificant increases. From 2011 to 2015, the number of youth who state 
that the opportunity to find work is “somewhat” or “completely” guaranteed, remains stable, increasing 
only one percentage point from 28 to 29 percent. In the same period, the equivalent number of youth 
who trust in democratic institutions goes down from 28 to 23.7 percent. All in all, the two curves seem 




To recap, when looking at the three indicators that together constitute economic performance, no clear 
link with institutional trust can be observed. Whereas a weak link can be detected regarding the way 
youth perceive of their personal economic situation, this is not the case when it comes to their 
evaluation of service delivery and job opportunities. Economic performance perception thus cannot 





H1I4 Evaluation of citizen security  
H1I5 Evaluation of progress in reducing corruption 
H1I6 Approval of government management 
 
After analysing trends in economic performance, the next section deals with the second component of 
democratic performance, related to political performance. Here, the three curve charts presented will 
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Figure 7a. “Evaluation of citizen security” 
 
Data retrieved from www.latinobarometro.org, 23/06/2016 
 
Looking at the first indicator, “evaluation of citizen security”, a strong correlation appears to exist 
between the number of youth who characterize their society as safe and the number of youth who 
trust in democratic institutions. From 2010 to 2011 we can observe a comparable decline on the two 
curves. In 2010, 23 percent state that citizen security is either “good” or “very good”, whereas the 
number drops to 16 percent in 2011. Similarly, the number of youth who have “some” or “much” trust 
in institutions goes markedly down, from 41 percent in 2010 to 28 percent in 2011. The following two 
years, the decline continues on both curves, in both cases at a lower rate. In the case of citizen security 
numbers go from 16 to 11 percent, and in the case of institutional trust from 28 to 16 percent. From 
2013 to 2015, both perceptions of citizen security and institutional trust go up once more, again at a 
more or less identical pace. The number of youth who are positive of the level of citizen security thus 
increases 9 percent, to a total of 20 percent, the number of youth trusting in institutions increases 8.7 
percent, to 23.7 percent. As such, it seems plausible to say that a very strong, and almost perfect, 
correlation exists between how secure youth feel and how much they trust their democratic 
institutions. However, it is important to note that citizen security has only been measured from 2010 
to 2015. The trends observed are thus based on a somewhat limited data material, which should be 
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Figure 7b. “Evaluation of progress in reducing corruption” 
 
Data retrieved from www.latinobarometro.org, 23/06/2016 
 
When it comes to the second indicator of political performance, “evaluation of progress in reducing 
corruption”, an analytically interesting pattern reveals itself. Except from 2005 to 2006, developments 
on the two curves seem to follow the exact same pattern during the entire period from 2005 to 2015, 
with positive evaluations of the progress in reducing corruption resulting in increases in numbers of 
youth expressing trust in democratic institutions, and, conversely, negative evaluations of the progress 
in reducing corruption followed by declining numbers of youth expressing trust in democratic 
institutions. Looking first at the exception, from 2005 to 2006, we can observe an increase from 29 to 
41 percent in the number of youth stating that they observe “some” or “a lot” of reduction of 
corruption. This increase is not reflected in the numbers of youth who trust democratic institutions, 
which declines slightly from 31.7 percent to 30. From 2006 and onwards, however, we see a completely 
different picture. From 2006 to 2007, a slightly higher number of youth, 44 percent, evaluate anti-
corruption efforts positively, and trust in institutions increases to a corresponding level, reaching 42 
percent. From here on, the two curves develop almost identically, with only minor differences from 
year to year (2008: 28 vs. 25.7 percent; 2009: 28 vs. 27 percent; 2010: 37 vs. 41 percent; 2011: 25 vs. 
28 percent; 2013: 18 vs. 16 percent; 2015: 34 vs. 23.7 percent). Considering these figures, it appears 
that a very strong empirical link exists between how youth evaluate the system’s performance against 
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Figure 7c. “Approval of government management” 
 
Data retrieved from www.latinobarometro.org, 23/06/2016 
 
When it comes to the third and final indicator of political performance, “approval of government 
management”, the above picture is sustained, although the correlation observed here, is much less 
straight-forward than was the case above. As can be observed in figure 7c, youth’s satisfaction with 
government management fluctuates greatly over the 10-year period in question with high approval 
ratings in 2007 (59 percent), 2011 (57 percent), and 2015 (56 percent), and very low approval ratings 
in 2008 (34 percent), 2009 (0 percent!), and 2013 (26 percent). Here it is worth noting, that youth seem 
to have reacted strongly against the actions of the 2009-administration led by Manuel Zelaya, whereas 
approval rates increase drastically in the aftermath of the coup d’état. When comparing these trends 
to the simultaneous changes in levels of democratic trust, we see some similarity in development 
patterns. As in the case of approval of government management, the number of youth who trust in 
democratic institutions increases from 2006 (30 percent) to 2007 (42 percent) and decreases from 2007 
to 2008 (25.7 percent). From 2008 to 2009, however, whereas approval ratings drop significantly, we 
can observe a surprising increase in the number of youth who trust in institutions. Normally, this would 
lead us to conclude, that no correlation exists. However, considering the fact that youth, according to 
this chart, reacted extremely negatively to the politics of president Zelaya, and seem to place 
themselves on the side that see his ousting as the right option, it is possible to interpret the 
simultaneous increase in institutional trust as a sign that, in this case, the democratic institutions are 
perceived to function well. While it is important not to over-interpret the circumstances around the 
event, it does seem a likely explanation and should not be ruled out. This is especially the case, in the 
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taking into account, the specific characteristics of governing around 2009, it appears that a close link 
exists between the number of youth who approve of government management and the number of 
youth who trust in democratic institutions. 
 
Sum-up 
To sum-up, combining the above trends on the three indicators that together constitute political 
performance, it seems plausible to conclude that a strong link with institutional trust appears to exist. 
Indicator 1, “evaluation of citizen security” and indicator 2, “evaluation of progress in reducing 
corruption” both show very strong correlation. Indicator 3, “approval of government management”, 
shows a more ambiguous relation, which is however strengthened when we inculcate the specific 
circumstances surrounding the coup d’état in 2009. According to the empirical data, political 






Civic culture determines the level of trust in democratic institutions 
 
The second independent variable which will be tested is “civic culture”. In order to examine the link 
between the civic culture among Honduran youth and the level of trust they convey to democratic 
institutions, we will look at trends regarding their civic engagement and social capital. 
  
As was the case above, in the following, three curve charts will be presented, each representing one of 
the three indicators which together constitute civic engagement; participation in civic associations, 
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Figure 8a. “Participation in civic organizations” 
 
Data retrieved from www.latinobarometro.org, 23/06/2016 
 
Regarding the first indicator of civic engagement, “participation in civic organizations”, it is important 
to note, that no data on actual participatory patterns of youth exists. What is measured here is instead 
the level to which youth find such participation to be important. From 2007 to 2008, the two curves 
follow the same pattern. The number of youth who find civic participation important drops from 48 to 
34 percent, whereas the number of youth who trust in democratic institutions drops from 42 to 25.7 
percent. The rest of the period, however, we find diverging patterns, where developments on the two 
curves consistently contradict each other. While the number of youth who find participation important 
continues to drop the two following years, reaching 23 percent in 2009 and 19 percent in 2010, we find 
the opposite trend in their levels of institutional trust. In 2009, 27 percent state that they have “some” 
or “much” trust in democratic institutions, and in 2010, the equivalent number is 41 percent. From 
2010 to 2011, a renewed interest in civic participation can be observed, as numbers increase from 19 
to 28 percent. Oppositely, the same year the level of trust decreases to 28 percent. During the last four 
years of the period, a slow increase in the number of youth who find participation important can be 
detected, but this fails to translate into more institutional trust, with numbers decreasing gradually until 
2015, where they reach their lowest point, with only 23.7 percent of youth trustful of democratic 
institutions. All in all, no correlation appears to exists between participation in civic organizations and 
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Figure 8b. “Interest in news” 
 
Data retrieved from www.latinobarometro.org, 23/06/2016 
 
The second indicator, “interest in news”, measures the number of youth who follow the news at least 
5 days a week, either through television or radio broadcasts or by reading it in a newspaper. Here, we 
can observe no consistent correlation to the level of trust in democratic institutions. From 2005 to 
2006, there is a slight increase in the number of youth who show a high level of interest in news, 
increasing from 22.3 percent to 25.3 percent. The same year, a slight decrease can be observed in the 
number of youth who trust in democratic institutions, going from 31.7 to 30 percent. From 2006 to 
2007, both curves increase significantly, going from 25.4 to 39.3 percent and from 20 to 42 percent, 
respectively. However, from 2007 to 2011, the two curves demonstrate opposing trends. In the case of 
news interest, during this period, a gradual decline takes place in the number of very news-interested 
youth, going from 39.3 percent in 2007, over 34 percent in 2009, 28.3 percent in 2010 and as low as 
9.3 percent in 2011. In the same period, the number of youth who trust in democratic institutions 
fluctuates, decreasing from 42 percent in 2007 to 27 percent in 2009, and increasing to 41 percent in 
2010, after which it again decreases to 28 percent in 2011. In conclusion, the level of trust Honduran 


















1 2 3 4 5 6
H2I2 Interest in news
Follows news at least 5 days a week
"Some" or "much" trust in democratic institutions
Development and International Relations  29 July 2016 




Student number: 20141885  Page 41 of 61 
Figure 8c. “Engagement in talks about politics with friends” 
 
 
Data retrieved from www.latinobarometro.org, 23/06/2016 
 
The third indicator of civic engagement measures the level of “engagement in talks about politics with 
friends”. As was the case with the second indicator, here, figures are also rather inconclusive. While a 
correlation can be observed in some periods, in others it does not seem plausible as trends go in 
opposite directions. From 2005 to 2007, an almost identical development on the two curves can be 
observed. From 2005 to 2006, the number of youth “frequently” or “very frequently” talking about 
politics with their friends decreases from 22 to 15 percent. In 2007 it goes back up to 23 percent. In a 
similar fashion, the corresponding number of youth who state that they trust in democratic institutions 
drops from 31.7 percent in 2005 to 31 percent in 2006, after which it increases to 42 percent in 2007. 
From 2007 to 2015 we see the opposite trend. While the tendency to discuss political matters with 
friends stays almost entirely stable throughout the period, ranging only from 21 to 23 percent, we see 
a very significant drop in support for democratic institutions from 42 percent in 2007 to 16 percent in 
2013, followed by an increase to 23.7 percent in 2015. Thus, although developments in the first part of 
the period lead us toward concluding in favour of a correlation, when looking at the overall picture 
including numbers from the last period, it becomes clear that no relation between the two curves can 
be discerned.  
 
Sum-up 
When taken together, the results on the three indicators constituting civic engagement are consistent 
in showing no correlation with trust in democratic institutions. Whereas some examples of convergence 
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in civic organizations” and indicator 2, “interest in news” show absolutely no empirical association. Civic 





H2I4 Degree to which politics is perceived to be complicated 
H2I5 Interpersonal trust 
H2I6 Level of satisfaction with life 
 
 
After analysing trends in civic engagement, the next section deals with the second component of civic 
culture, related to social capital. Here, the three curve charts presented will be; the degree to which 
politics is perceived to be complicated, interpersonal trust, and the level of satisfaction with life. 
 
Figure 9a. “Degree to which politics is perceived to be complicated“ 
 
Data retrieved from www.latinobarometro.org, 23/06/2016 
 
Regarding the first indicator of social capital, “degree to which politics is perceived to be complicated“, 
it is possible to identify some correlation with the level of trust in democratic institutions. The 
correlation is, however, weak and somewhat inconsistent.  From 2005 to 2007 a slight increase can be 
observed in the number of youth who find that politics are not too complicated to understand, going 
from 38 to 40 percent. In the same period, the number of youth who trust in democratic institutions 
increases markedly, going from 31.7 to 42 percent. In the following period, from 2007 to 2010, both 
curves decrease, but whereas institutional trust only decreases one percentage point, the number of 
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developments on the two curves diverge, with increases on the former and decline on the latter. From 
2011 to 2013 and again from 2013 to 2015, however, they return to similar trajectories. In 2011, 35 
percent of youth find politics not too complicated, while this number falls to 33 percent in 2013 and 
then increases to 46 percent in 2015. Similarly, whereas, in 2011, 28 percent of youth trust in 
democratic institutions, the number goes down to 16 percent in 2013, after which it grows to 23.7 
percent in 2015. Overall, although, in some periods, figures on the two curves do increase or decrease 
simultaneously, in most cases the volume of these fluctuations are very different. This leads us to 




Figure 9b. “Interpersonal trust” 
 
Data retrieved from www.latinobarometro.org, 23/06/2016 
 
Turning to the second indicator of social capital, “interpersonal trust”, we reach a similar conclusion. 
From 2005 to 2006, the number of youth who feel that they can trust the majority of people grows 
from 14 to 23 percent. Meanwhile, the number of youth who trust in democratic institutions drops 
slightly from 31.7 to 30 percent. In the following year, trends on both curves are reversed. While 
interpersonal trust decreases to 16 percent in 2007, institutional trust on the other hand increases to 
42 percent. In 2008 tables are turned once again with more youth expressing trust in persons and less 
youth expressing trust in institutions. It is possible to detect positive empirical association only in two 
intervals – between 2009 and 2010, and between 2011 and 2013. In the first case, a small increase in 
the number of youth who find the majority of people trustworthy (2 percentage points) is followed by 
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interpersonal trust declines from 33 to 19 percent, whereas institutional trust drops from 28 to 16 
percent. Based on these observations, it seems reasonable to disclaim that the level of interpersonal 
trust can explain why youth have low trust in democratic institutions. Interestingly, until 2009, the two 
curves demonstrate almost perfect reversed developments, implying that, anti-thetically to our 
hypothesis, lower levels of interpersonal trust should somehow lead to higher levels of institutional 
trust. This seems highly illogical, however, and is also rejected based on the trajectories in the following 
years. 
 
Figure 9c. “Level of satisfaction with life” 
 
Data retrieved from www.latinobarometro.org, 23/06/2016 
 
Whereas observations on the two first indicators have left us with a clear impression that no correlation 
exists between social capital and institutional trust, the third and final indicator of social capital, “level 
of satisfaction with life” provides us with a slightly more nuanced picture. In four cases we can observe 
a positive correlation. From 2004 to 2005 we see a decline in number of positive statements both when 
it comes to life satisfaction and trust in democratic institutions. Whereas the former decreases from 82 
to 74 percent, the latter decreases from 34.4 to 31.7 percent. From 2007 to 2008 both curves decrease 
dramatically, life satisfaction going from 76 to 63 percent and institutional trust from 42 to 25.6 
percent. From 2008 to 2010, both curves go up – from 2008 to 2009 following a similar trajectory, 
whereas from 2009 to 2010 the increase is much greater in the level of institutional trust. From 2011 
to 2013 both curves decline, the number of youth considering themselves satisfied with life only 
marginally, going from 75 to 74 percent, and the level of institutional trust dropping from 28 to 16 
percent. Conversely, in the periods from 2005-2006, 2006-2007, 20010-2011, and 2013-2015, 
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from 2006 to 2007 and from 2010 to 2011. From 2006 to 2007, the number of youth who state that 
they are “very” or “fairly” satisfied with life declines from 82 to 76 percent, while the number of youth 
who have “some” or “much” trust in democratic institutions increases from 30 to 42 percent. From 
2010 to 2011, the former increases from 69 and 75 percent, whereas the latter declines from 41 and 
28 percent. To recap, although some examples of convergence can be detected, it is too inconsistent 
to conclude that any correlation exists between the level of satisfaction with life and the level of trust 
in democratic institutions. 
 
Sum-up 
Compiling the results on the three indicators listed above leaves us with a quite unambiguous picture, 
showing no consistent correlation between social capital and institutional trust. Based on this, we can 
conclude that the level of social capital among youth in Honduras does not determine their level of 
trust in democratic institutions and that recent declines in levels of institutional trust cannot be 
explained by decline in social capital. 
 
 
When looking at results from over-time developments in public opinion, it appears that political 
performance, as the only of the four variables examined above, can explain why youth have low trust 
in democratic institutions. However, before concluding definitively on the explanatory power of this 
variable, a closer cross-examination of the results will serve to strengthen the findings. In the following, 
a qualitative analysis based on a literary review will be conducted in order to test the validity of the 
argument that political performance perception determines the level of trust youth have in democratic 
institutions. Adding a qualitative perspective to the quantitative analysis conducted above will serve to 
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Literature review: political performance 
As suggested by William Mishler and Richard Rose, when examining regime performance, and in this 
case political performance, a good approach can be to “compare the current against the older regime, 
since this provides a common standard” (Mishler and Rose in Norris 1999: 6-7). However, when looking 
at figure 10, we can observe that the level of trust is not contingent on party alignment, as the two 
periods of greatest decline in trust (2007-2008 and 2010-2013) took place during a Liberal and National 
administration, respectively. Therefore, instead of comparing the performance of individual 
governments, we will examine the political developments during the period in which we see the 
greatest and most consistent deterioration in institutional trust among youth in Honduras – the period 
from 2010 to 2013.  
 
Figure 10. “Trust in democratic institutions under different administrations 2006 
– 2014” 
 
Data retrieved from www.latinobarometro.org, 23/06/2016 
 
After the coup d’état in 2009, and the end of the interim 6-months government led by Vice-president 
and member of the Liberal Party (PL), Roberto Micheletti, Porfirio Lobo Sosa from the National Party 
(PN) was elected president on January 27th 2010. Lobo was in power from 2010 to 2014, including the 
three years of extreme decline in trust among Honduran youth. According to the hypothesis, we should 
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The literary sources available characterize the period from 2010 to 2013 as a period of increasing levels 
of crime and a general worsening of the security situation. After a period with a softer policy approach 
towards criminal and security issues under the administrations of Zelaya and Micheletti, President Lobo 
reinstated the hard-line strategy focusing on Mano Dura politics and militarization of the public sphere 
(Carvajal 2014: 17). As we saw in one of the first chapters of this paper, crime rates have been on the 
rise during the entire period from 2006, under liberal as well as nationalist governments. However, 
during the Lobo administration, the situation deteriorated at an alarming rate, with crime rates 
reaching an unprecedented high point in 2011, where 91 intentional homicides were recorded per 
100.000 people (www.data.worldbank.org, 17/07/2016). It was during this period, Honduras received 
its name as the world’s murder capital. According to Peter Meyer, although the Lobo-administration 
“adopted a number of policy reforms designed to address these challenges, conditions did not 
improve”. On the contrary, “the poor security and human rights situation in Honduras continued to 
deteriorate under President Lobo” (Meyer 2014: 494). In spite of a very strong focus on public security, 
the government during this period thus did not manage to improve or even halt, the spiral of violence 
which spun out of control. 
 
According to Lirio Gutiérrez Rivera, not only did the levels of violence increase, but the character of 
violence changed as a new wave of political violence saw the light of day aimed at LGBT, human rights 
activists and political opponents as well as members of youth associations (Rivera 2013: 1999). Several 
authors have observed the same, highlighting the period as especially detrimental because of the 
increase in human rights violations. 2010 appears to have been particularly grim, with a number of 
examples; on August 13, police attacked peaceful demonstrators in Choloma with tear gas; on August 
26 and 27, teachers protesting in Tegucigalpa were attacked in a similar fashion; and on September 17, 
Juana Bustillo, a leader in the social security workers’ union was shot and killed (Frank 2010: 1). With 
nine journalists critical of the government killed in the first months of 2010 alone, James Bosworth 
concludes that, in that year, Honduras was “one of the most dangerous countries in the world for 
journalists” (Bosworth 2010: 18). Bosworth furthermore mentions “the government’s unwillingness to 
take the investigation of crimes seriously” as a key factor in a worsening situation (Ibid.,: 18). In a similar 
fashion, a report from the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) concluded that “the government’s 
ongoing failure to successfully investigate crimes against journalists and other social critics - whether 
by intention, impotence, or incompetence - has created a climate of pervasive impunity” (www.cpj.org, 
21/07/2016). Although the Lobo administration did in fact take some steps to address human rights 
issues, including the implementation of an investigative unit under the Attorney General and a National 
Commission on Human Rights (CONADEH) dedicated to investigate and denounce abuses, these 
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initiatives had little effect and violations continued throughout the period (Bosworth 2010: 26). 
 
The deteriorating situation was also noticed outside of Honduras. Particularly in the US, where the 
situation was viewed with growing concern by many democrats who were critical of the substantial 
economic contribution from the US to the hardline policies carried out in Honduras. The subject was 
several times brought up in the American Congress where these critics pleaded for a halt of American 
security assistance to Honduras until human rights were guaranteed. Roger Noriega and Javier Lanza, 
in their study “Honduras Under Siege”, give a detailed overview of the North American reactions to the 
situation in Honduras, providing us with an understanding of the severity of the situation: 
 
 In May 2011, 87 Democrats in the House of Representatives called on then–secretary of state 
Hillary Clinton to suspend police and military assistance to Honduras “due to the lack of 
mechanisms in place to ensure security forces are held accountable for abuses.” 
 
 Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA), then ranking member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, sent 
two letters, in November 2011 and October 2012, raising questions about US security assistance 
to Honduras. 
 
 In March 2012, seven Democratic senators, led by Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), sent a letter 
to Clinton reminding her that US security assistance was contingent upon certification that 
Honduras was doing all it could to prosecute human rights violators. 
 
 In January 2013, 58 House Democrats sent a letter to new Secretary of State John Kerry and 
Attorney General Eric Holder requesting a further investigation of the May 2012 incident at 
Ahuas. 
 
 In March, 94 House Democrats signed a letter sponsored by Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), again 
calling for a suspension of US security assistance to Honduras. 
 
 Finally, on June 17, a group of 21 senators sent a letter to Secretary Kerry asking for a review of 
aid destined for the Honduran military and police. 
(Noriega and Lanza 2013: 6) 
 
As a result of this pressure and the continued human rights violations, the US administration ended up 
suspending some of its security programs in Honduras. Instead, some of the funds were diverted to the 
installment of a purging unit to clean out police officials involved in human rights violations. As then-US 
Ambassador in the country, Lisa J. Kubiske, hinting at the problematic, stated: “In democracies, police 
are used to enforce the law and the military is used to protect the borders” (Malkin 2013:1).  
 
Related to the problem of human rights violations is the issue of political integrity. This was a redundant 
theme throughout the period, with recurring discussions of lacking political impartiality and problems 
regarding the constitutional separation of powers. In the abovementioned case, many were critical of 
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the decision to designate Ramón Custodio as head of CONADEH, because of the role Custodio had 
played during the previous government (Bosworth 2010: 26). Another example is found in the sacking 
of a judge who opposed a Supreme Court ruling which had the intention of legitimizing the ousting of 
President Zelaya (Ibid.,: 26). These are just two examples of politicizing of the judicial system, which 
demonstrate inherent problems in the performance of the democratic system. 
 
Likewise, several authors have pointed to the failure of the Lobo regime to deal with the high levels of 
corruption during the period (Bosworth 2010: 25, Meyer 2014: 494). Although the government initially 
embarked on a road of institutional reform in an attempt to deal with the widespread corruption across 
the system, follow-up in terms of actual policy-making was almost non-existing. One example is the 
establishment of two anti-corruption bodies initiated by the government itself to reform the justice 
system. In December 2011, The Directorate for the Investigation and Evaluation of the Police Career 
(DIECP), replaced the ineffective internal affairs unit of the police force (Meyer 2014: 507). In January 
2012, another body followed; The Public Security Reform Commission (Comisión de Reforma a la 
Seguridad Pública, CRSP), with mandate to investigate the police, the public prosecutor’s office, and 
the judiciary, and suggest reforms to strengthen the institutions (Ibid.,: 507). Whereas the former body 
was simply ineffective in creating results, the latter did conduct a series of institutional evaluations on 
the basis of which, in October 2012, a set of reforms to the police, the public prosecutor’s office and 
the judiciary was proposed. According to Meyer, these recommendations were, however, never taken 
into account by neither the Lobo administration, nor the Honduran Congress, and thus never resulted 
in any tangible institutional change (Ibid.,: 507). 
 
When looking at the findings from various authors who have dealt with these issues, it is clear that the 
period from 2010 to 2013 represents a time of serious deterioration in citizen security, human rights 
and political integrity in Honduras. Concerning citizen security, whether it was an expression of a flawed 
political strategy or due to a lack of resources, the return to Mano Dura policies proved unsuccessful in 
controlling rising crime rates in the years after the coup d’état. Similarly, the integrity of the political 
system took a strong hit during those years, where corruption reached new heights and human rights 
violations were abundant. While the Lobo government is probably not without blame in this regard, it 
is important to mention that it is not the argument here that this specific administration bears the 
entire responsibility for the troublesome situation in Honduras. The historic circumstances no doubt 
placed the government in a complicated situation, where political instability and growing influence of 
organized criminal networks made political maneuvering difficult. What is relevant here is that we see 
a consistent pattern in the political developments during the period in which a large portion of 
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Honduran youth lost faith in democratic institutions. On all three indicators of political performance; 
“citizen security”, “progress in reducing corruption”, and “government management”, the findings 
from this literary review support the findings from the quantitative analysis. This leads us to the 
conclusion that hypothesis 1, “performance perception determines the level of trust in democratic 
institutions” is partially sustained. While no pattern can be observed in regards to economic 
performance, a strong and consistent correlation appears to exist between the way democracy 




Analysis: Implications for theory 
After examining the two delimited hypotheses and their relation to the phenomenon of democratic 
trust, the next section will relate the findings to the theoretical contributions presented in the beginning 
of the paper in order to answer the problem formulation. The aim here is to discern how the findings 
of this paper can inform the existing literature on trust in democratic institutions and discuss how this 
implicates existing theories that shape our understanding of democratic trust. 
 
Towards a focus on political performance 
 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis stated that “performance perception determines level of trust in democratic 
institutions”. This hypothesis builds on a theoretical frame which assumes that people’s perception of 
the polity’s ability to deliver tangible political as well as economic results is the main factor in 
determining the level of trust they designate to their polity. 
 
Economic performance 
As we saw in the theoretical chapter, several authors are in favour of the argument that levels of trust 
are contingent upon economic performance. Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider have found 
that “confidence levels vary with the state of the economy” (Lipset & Schneider 1987: 5). Espinal et. al. 
that “evaluation of government services, consistently has one of the most important effects on trust” 
(Espinal et. al. 2006: 14). And Herbert Kitschelt, that “people’s perception of their own and their 
country’s economic situation must be seen as key predictors of democratic support” (Kitschelt in Evans 
& Whitefield 1995: 487). 
 
In order to test these arguments, developments on three indicators of democratic performance over a 
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10-year period were compared to simultaneous developments in the level of trust youth have in 
democratic institutions. Similar to Espinal et. al.’s study, the first indicator looked at young Hondurans’ 
evaluation of service delivery. Whereas Espinal et. al. found a positive correlation between evaluations 
of service and levels of trust in democratic institutions, this was not what the empirical data showed in 
the Honduran case. On the contrary, no consistent pattern was observed during the period in question, 
with levels of trust fluctuating independently of service delivery satisfaction. Testing the argument of 
Kitschelt, the second indicator looked at youth’s perception of their personal economic situation. In 
contrast to the findings of Kitschelt, when it comes to the way Honduran youth perceive of their 
personal economic situation only a weak relation to institutional trust could be discerned. We see the 
same picture when it comes to the third indicator. As with the two first indicators, nothing indicates a 
link between levels of trust and youth’s evaluation of job opportunities. 
 
Political performance 
While no correlation could be observed when it comes to economic performance perception, in the 
case of political performance, we observed a completely different picture. In the theoretical chapter, 
we saw that some authors have placed political performance at the root of determining democratic 
trust. Evans and Whitefield argue that “people support democracies because they are seen to work, 
reflecting respondents' experience of the pay-offs from democracy itself” (Evans & Whitefield 1995: 
503). Although they furthermore state that “both economic and political factors are relevant to 
predicting support for democratic institutions” they go on to conclude that “the indicators of political 
pay-offs have considerably stronger effects” (Ibid.,: 503). Similarly, Espinal et. al. argue that “trust in 
government institutions is shaped primarily by perceptions of (economic and) political performance” 
(Espinal et. al. 2006: 1). Regarding the specific subject of corruption, they furthermore find that 
“perceptions of corruption influence trust consistently over time” (Ibid.,: 15). 
 
In line with this, the results of the empirical analysis provide us with a very clear indication that low 
trust in democratic institutions is indeed rooted in the poor political performance. In the Honduran 
case, unsuccessful attempts to contain expanding organized criminal networks and an increased 
presence of less organized street gangs have led to diminishing levels of public security and alarmingly 
high levels of violence. At the same time, corruption scandals and human rights violations have become 
part of the everyday picture, with frequent reports of killings of journalists, political activists and human 
rights activists. Meanwhile, young people feel their society is everyday more dangerous, and they 
observe a political system incapable of providing them with political leadership characterized by 
integrity and the ability to deliver change. Based on findings from both the quantitative survey and 
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qualitative literature review, it can thus be concluded that institutional trust is strongly correlated to 
the political performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis stated that “civic culture determines level of trust in democratic institutions”. 
This hypothesis rests on a theoretical frame which assumes that civic engagement and social capital, 
together constituting civic culture, are the main determinants when it comes to explaining why youth 
distrust democratic institutions. 
 
Civic culture 
A range of authors have emphasized the effect of an active and participating citizenry as a key factor 
when it comes to generating trust in democratic institutions. According to Almond and Verba 
democratic trust is “maintained by active citizen participation in civic affairs, by a high level of 
information about public affairs, and by a widespread sense of civic responsibility” (Almond and Verba 
1989: 9). Putnam has concluded that “the level of civic engagement is a determining factor when it 
comes to the success of democracy” (Putnam 1995: 66). And, in a similar fashion, Inglehart has found 
that “democratic institutions seem to depend on enduring cultural traits such as life satisfaction and 
interpersonal trust” (Inglehart 1988: 1209). 
 
Whereas it is hard to find arguments against the inherently positive aspects of a civic culture in which 
people are able and willing to participate in society and interact with the political system, the findings 
of this paper do not point to civic culture as a determining factor of Honduran youths’ trust in 
democratic institutions. When looking at the three first indicators of civic culture, results were 
consistent in showing no correlation between the youths’ level of civic engagement and their trust in 
democratic institutions. This was the case both when looking at participation in civic organizations, 
interest in news and engagement in talks about politics with friends. Similar results were found on the 
three indicators constituting social capital. Neither the degree to which youth perceived politics to be 
complicated, nor their level of interpersonal trust or satisfaction with life showed any correlation to the 
level of trust confer to democratic institutions. While it might be true, as Inglehart has argued, that 
“among the polities of Europe, basic satisfaction with life and political circumstance, and levels of inter-
personal trust, are strongly correlated with both the existence of relatively long-lived and stable 
democratic institutions” (Ibid.,: 1207-16), this does not seem to be the case when it comes to the 
Honduran context. Here, trust in democratic institutions seems to be disconnected from issues of 
interpersonal trust and satisfaction with life as well as with active civic engagement. Thus, although lack 
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of civic engagement and social capital might be problematic for many reasons, it does not seem to hold 
true, as argued by Putnam, that “there is reason to suspect that this democratic disarray may be linked 
to a broad and continuing erosion of civic engagement”. When it comes to trust in democratic 
institutions, it does not seem crucial to answer the question of “how to reverse these adverse trends 
in social connectedness, thus restoring civic engagement and civic trust” (Putnam 1995: 76). 
 
Generalizing the results 
Whereas the empirical analysis left us with a rather unambiguous result, it is important not to claim too 
much on the basis of what can be seen as a rather limited empirical foundation. Expanding the empirical 
foundation through cross-country comparisons or inclusion of more indicators would without doubt 
have strengthened the validity of the findings. Likewise, critics might address the issue concerning the 
direction of causality and meaningfully question the blind faith in a specific direction of influence going 
from respectively, civic culture and democratic performance to levels of trust in democratic institutions. 
In particular it could be argued that normative support for democracy would tend to induce better 
performance evaluation, rather than vice versa. Comparing over-time developments on these two 
variables obviously does not rule out the possibility of reciprocal causality. What strengthens the 
internal validity of the findings, however, is that a quantitative analysis of survey data and qualitative 
data based on a literary interview, independent of each other, reached the same conclusion. Whereas 
the quantitative analysis focusing on youth’s perception of performance might be biased by such 
reciprocal causality, it seems highly unlikely, considering the fact that actual political performance in 
the period was completely consistent with youth’s perception of the situation. Based on 
methodological triangulation, it thus seems plausible to conclude that institutional trust is a function of 
political performance, rather than the other way around. 
 
Concerning external validity, the degree to which the findings of this paper can be generalized to other 
empirical contexts, can likewise be debated. From a methodological perspective, considering that the 
second hypothesis deals with civic culture, much depends on whether one accepts the liberal or 
Lockean understanding of civil society proposed here, putting emphasis on the individualistic traits of 
civil society. Similarly, concerns could arise as to the applicability of a conceptual framework developed 
in studies of mainly Western societies. Perhaps, this is where the study has most to contribute. Whereas 
few scholars have dealt with democratic trust in so-called unconsolidated or developing democracies, 
this study contributes to a recent trend started by Espinal et. al. and others, considering democratic 
trust outside of a Western context increasingly relevant for academic research. Going a step further, 
this study has attempted to demonstrate that changes in levels of democratic trust is not necessarily a 
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one-size-fits-all in which only studies of general populations have relevance. Rather, it suggests that 
much analytical insight can be gained from extracting a specific part of the population, looking at 
specific tendencies of, in this case, youth and changes in their attitudes toward democracy. As such, it 
is argued that the paper serves as an example that 1) studies of democratic trust in developing contexts 
is not only possible but highly necessary, and 2) that studies of democratic trust have much to gain from 









































Development and International Relations  29 July 2016 




Student number: 20141885  Page 55 of 61 
Conclusion 
 
“Today we are witnessing a significant lack of trust by youth in the traditional institutions 
of democracy. As no sustainable and inclusive democracy can be built without youth, 
addressing this challenge needs to be a priority.” 
Joan Sawe, Acting Secretary-General of 
International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 
(Sawe 2013: 1) 
 
After a rapid decline over the last few years, Honduran youth now have very low trust in three of the 
most important democratic institutions: only 25.0 percent express trust in Government, 23.4 percent 
in the Judiciary, and 21.1 percent trust in Congress (www.latinobarometro.org, 23/03/2016). With less 
than a quarter of the total youth population expressing trust in the institutions on which democracy is 
founded, it is crucial to start looking for answers as to what causes such democratic distrust and how 
the declining trend can be reversed. In that perspective, the aim of this paper has been to understand 
what explains fluctuations in democratic trust. Applying a causal research design, the paper has 
examined the explanatory power of two contemporary theoretical approaches from the literature on 
democratic trust; one focusing on performance perception, the other on civic culture. 
 
Based on results from a quantitative opinion survey and a subsequent qualitative literature review, the 
paper concludes that Honduran youths’ decreasing democratic trust in recent years is caused by a lack 
of political performance. Declining levels of citizen security, increasing levels of corruption and the 
feeling that there is an inherent incapability in the political system to deal with these issues constitute 
the main ingredients in explaining why young people distrust democratic institutions.  
 
In contrast, economic performance perception when it comes to the system’s ability to provide quality 
service delivery, job opportunities and sound personal economic situations have no correlation to the 
level of trust youth have in democratic institutions. This is also the case, when it comes to civic culture, 
where over-time changes are disconnected from the levels of trust youth confer to democratic 
institutions. Neither civic engagement, measured through indicators of active citizen participation, 
interest in news, and engagement in talks about politics with friends, nor social capital understood as 
the degree to which politics is perceived to be complicated, as well as through levels of interpersonal 
trust and satisfaction with life, demonstrate any empirical association to the phenomenon of 
democratic trust. 
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While supporting the theoretical framework proposed by scholars such as Evans and Whitefield and 
Espinal et. al., this conclusion challenges the findings of a range of scholars emphasizing civic culture as 
the main determinant in democratic trust. While not neglecting the importance of building civic 
cultures characterized by high levels of social capital and civic engagement, this paper places itself 
within a theoretical approach, emphasizing political performance perception as the main factor in 
determining variations in democratic trust. 
  
Considering that young people between 15 and 25 constitute a fifth of the world’s population, there is 
an urgent need to ensure their inclusion in political processes. Just as politically marginalized youth 
tend to adopt anti-social and high-risk behaviours, youth who feel included in the political processes 
have the potential to become a transformative power in the continued process of democratization, in 
Honduras as well as on the Latin American continent in general. In order to earn the trust of youth and 
rebuild their confidence in democratic institutions, politicians and professionals alike need to provide 
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